ABSTRACT The fifth-generation (5G) technology makes it widely applicable to connected vehicles. This would entail numerous transmitted data in communication networks and frequent information interactions between vehicles and other terminals, thus leading connected vehicles to be vulnerable to attacks from external communication interfaces. This paper analyzes potential security threats of 5G vehicular network and focuses on intrusion detection methods for in-vehicle networks. We choose four experiment scenarios from potential attacks for in-vehicle networks and collect real car data to compile various attack databases for the first time. In order to find appropriate methods to identify different attacks, four light-weight intrusion detection methods are presented to recognize abnormal behaviors of in-vehicle networks. Furthermore, our study undertakes the detection performance comparison between four detection methods with considering comprehensive evaluation metrics. The evaluation results provide optimal light-weight detection solution for in-vehicle networks. This paper facilitates the understanding of the advantages of the test methods in detection performance for in-vehicle networks and promotes the application of detection technology to deal with the security issues of automotive industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile communication technology and Internet of Things are now here to stay, and communication services mushroom [1] - [3] . The traditional communication technology makes it difficult for mobile operators to meet all possible application scenarios. As the latest mobile communication technology, 5G will further enhance the demand of Internet of Things and provide variety application experiences for mobile internets [4] . Owing to the advanced communication technology, 5G vehicular network will be improved in communication mode, quality, and architecture. However, a new challenge for communication security will face 5G vehicular network [5] , [6] . Specifically, if there were invaded cars in vehicular networks, other cars would be vulnerable to false information and users would suffer personal information leakage [7] . Except that, these malware cars could eavesdrop on identity authentication information of other cars, causing traffic disorder and property losses. This paper thus comes to investigate an effective security mechanism to protect 5G vehicular network. In the communication nodes of 5G vehicular network, we choose on board units to study the security threat perception of the network in an attempt to identify a light-weight security detection method by virtue of the rapidity and accuracy of networks.
In addition to the security threats from external communications, the ever-progressing intelligent technology also brings changes in modern vehicles, causing many security issues. Over 100 electronic control units (ECUs) and two billion running codes exist in the most advanced automobiles [8] , and then the enormous information will result in the vulnerability of communication data and bring about security threat. For instance, an intelligent vehicle is vulnerable to attacks during its frequent interactions with external communication terminals [9] , resulting in leakage of communication data and owners' privacy.
With frequent exposure of car attacks, numerous scholars have investigated the issue of automotive security [10] . So far there have been two major approaches: cryptography and intrusion detection system (IDS). As a passive protection technology, cryptography guarantees security of vehicle communication based on encryption and decryption algorithm [11] . Yet the on-board computer resources are limited and insider attacks cannot be detected. Comparatively, IDS, an active protection technology, can not only protect networks from insider attacks, but detect unknown attack behaviors. Thus, this paper makes intrusion detection system a priority and investigates its detection performance.
Due to the fact that computer resources are limited in on-board systems, researchers shift to light-weight detection algorithms to identify more feasible ways of attack. Light-weight detection methods can also meet the service requirements for multi-devices frequently connected to 5G. Although massive intrusion detection techniques have been proposed, adequate comparison of the strengths and limitations of these techniques are challenging, which will hinder the development of applications. For instance, abnormal data from real cars are absent, making it difficult to evaluate the performance of IDS. Besides, the detection methods proposed in relevant literatures are analyzed separately, without being compared with other methods under the same test conditions. In the present study, data from real cars are collected and attack data constructed in different scenarios. This paper employs receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve and Precision-Recall (P-R) curve to evaluate the performance of the presented detection methods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the literature review concerning IDS.
In Section III, we analyze the vulnerability of 5G vehicular network. Section IV proposes four typical attack scenarios for in-vehicle networks and involves major evaluation metrics considering two major characteristic curves, i.e., ROC curve and P-R curve. Subsequently, four light-weight detection methods and the result of performance evaluation comparison in two characteristic curves are listed in Section V. The last section summarizes this research and points out the problems not solved.
II. RELATED WORKS
Previous research on intrusion detection methods for invehicle networks mainly focus on messages transmitted in Controller Area Network (CAN), i.e., transmission frequency of periodic messages, identification (ID) of messages, the number of packets in unit reception time, message reception sequence, and semantics of data fields. Besides, on-board network protocols and the running status of cars are also utilized to detect intrusion behavior from attackers. It is clear that the above-listed information concerning messages can be regarded as normal features in contrast to abnormal behaviors. Therefore, the selection of proper normal features is of paramount importance for intrusion detection.
Light-weight detection algorithms have been applied in other fields and become the hot issue in the research of in-vehicle network security gradually. Generally, the lightweight detection methods for in-vehicle networks involve the typical features such as message receiving timestamps, interval times between two consecutive messages, information entropy of messages, the number of messages received in certain time, ID sequences, etc.
Considering the time interval of periodic messages, Song et al. [12] proposed a light-weight detection algorithm for intrusion detection in CAN bus, yet complex attack scenarios were absent in their analysis of abnormal data. By exploring the clock offset of the timestamp of in-vehicle messages, Cho and Shin [13] developed CIDS algorithm based on physical properties for accurate detection of various attack scenarios. The received messages can be authenticated by extracting clock offset ratio of on-board electronic control units (ECUs), proving that CIDS algorithm can recognize impersonation attacks with low false positive ratio.
Concerning the research on the type of messages in vehicle networks, Muter and Asaj [14] were the first employing information entropy to recognize three attack fields, i.e., increasing message transmit frequency, flooding, and tampering. This detection algorithm is excellent in multi-function but weak in sensitivity for tampering and spoof attacks.
According to statistics of in-vehicle network traffic, Taylor et al. [15] put forward an anomaly detection algorithm using a sliding window to measure interval time. This method can detect injection attacks and erasure behaviors, but cannot detect aperiodic messages. The method which mainly takes the traffic of in-vehicle network into consideration is called Throughput in this paper.
For different messages transmitted in vehicle networks, it is possible to establish normal message sequences as the detection feature. Marchetti and Stabili [16] constructed normal ID sequence model by transition matrix population by using collected data. This machine learning method detects injection attacks accurately and needs low computational overheads, yet false alarms and limitations are unavoidable.
Except light-weight detection methods, there are also complex algorithms considering other features like the change of data fields and the semantics change of messages.
Carrying the main information of in-vehicle networks, data fields of messages have certain regular change, like the sequence of binary data bits. Taylor et al. [17] exploited long short term memory (LSTM) networks to detect the sequence of messages in CAN network. LSTM algorithm has been proved to be favorable performance in detecting normal sequence and adaptable for cars.
Semantics analysis has become widely used for data from in-vehicle networks. Kang and Kang [18] investigated intrusion detection methods for data field characteristics in CAN bus by virtue of deep learning for the first time. Markovitz and Wool [19] separated unknown messages into different fields with greedy algorithm, and developed intrusion detection system by way of semantical analysis. This method can be used to detect various attacks with low false positive ratio.
In addition to the above methods, abnormal behaviors can be detected based on vehicle-running surroundings and particular running conditions as well. Hoppe et al. [20] raised the concept of intrusion detection by analyzing vehicle running status, and discussed three detection patterns: increasing message transmittance frequency, tempering identification (ID) of messages, and manipulating physical characteristics.
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Although the relevant research on intrusion detection methods for in-vehicle networks are numerous now, few scholars have compared their proposed methods with other ones under similar conditions. To obtain substantial differences among different methods, it is necessary to construct typical attack scenarios to validate and evaluate concerned methods. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to evaluate typical light-weight intrusion detection methods for in-vehicle networks.
III. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF 5G VEHICULAR NETWORK
Security plays the dominant role in vehicular networks all the time. There are many serious security problems in current vehicular network [21] , [22] . Taking an example, users' information would be in danger when a connected car is infected by malicious viruses and sends forged messages to cheat other cars. Besides, 5G vehicular network requires larger capacity and higher communication efficiency than traditional networks to achieve various applications [23] . There should be frequent certification between terminal devices and access nodes in 5G to prevent middleman attacks. As the transmitted data of users and vehicles would be transferred to on-board units, mobile terminals and base stations in 5G vehicular network, the protection of communication security becomes more imperative.
With changeable network architecture and widely application of different scenarios, 5G vehicular network will meet more challenges in security than traditional networks, such as securities of access, application, and trust.
A. ACCESS SECURITY
Access control plays an important role in 5G. It can protect spectrum and communication resources, and provide application services for accessed devices [24] . Different from that of 4G vehicular network, the access control of 5G vehicular network is faced with severe security risks (e.g., authentication) for supporting heterogeneous access technology and heterogeneous devices. Thus, a unified authentication framework is needed to realize accesses of different network architectures and nodes for 5G vehicular network. Therefore, 5G vehicular network should be equipped with real-time and efficient authentication system. However, the communication accesses of 5G vehicular network are vulnerable to attacks for the reason that the network needs many terminal access devices such as connected vehicles, traffic lights, and traffic infrastructure. Besides, massive access devices in 5G vehicular network makes it possible to cause denial of service (DoS) attack. In summary, massive interfaces and high-frequency access operations may impose security risks for 5G vehicular network, and the fragile authentication system can be used by hackers to exert attacks like eavesdropping and DoS attack.
B. APPLICATION SECURITY
Unlike traditional mobile communication networks, 5G supports massive data transmission and accesses of connected devices [25] . Frequent information interactions between access networks and the core network will increase consumption of network bandwidth and reduce data transmission rate, thereby leading to 5G vehicular network vulnerable to security threats from data transmission and undermining data integrity.
C. TRUST SECURITY
As a new communication mode, 5G will open network accesses for numerous third parties to provide rich experience businesses for users [26] . It is owing to 5G that the third parties can carry out network deployment and expansion independently. If there are trust risks during the open authorization, 5G will suffer attacks from malicious third parties. 5G vehicular network is faced with complex network communication environment due to the high mobility and fast access frequency of vehicles. Therefore, trust security concerning on vehicles and infrastructures constitutes a dominant challenge for 5G vehicular network.
The vulnerability analysis shows that 5G vehicular network faces severe security threat in all possible communication links. As a key node in 5G vehicular network, in-vehicle network is up against security challenges in confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, and so forth. The following section describes several typical attack scenarios on the basis of security analysis.
IV. ATTACK SCENARIOS AND EVALUATION METRICS A. ATTACK SCENARIOS
Although function security has been taken into consideration in the design of vehicular network architecture, security protection mechanism has not been established yet, thus causing increasing vulnerabilities for in-vehicle networks, e.g., CAN, Local interconnected Network (LIN), Media Oriented Systems Transport (MOST), and FlexRay [27] . For instance, the message broadcast mechanism and the node identification priority mechanism of CAN bus would bring about security risks from hackers as they can sniffer in-vehicle networks and obtain on-board transmitted messages by employing these mechanisms [28] to send pseudo messages to control vehicles.
A swelling number of information security events have been reported recently. Researchers have discussed attack types [29] , [30] from different views on varying attack modes. These attacks include eavesdropping, spoof, drop, tampering, flooding, and replay. Descriptions of these attack types are as follows and logical sketch maps are presented in Fig. 1 .
(1) Eavesdropping: monitoring communication data in CAN network by sniffers or diagnostic devices.
(2) Spoof: sending forged messages generated arbitrarily to interface communication or complete reverse engineering in vehicle networks. (6) Replay: eavesdropping communications and injecting certain messages repeatedly for reverse protocol or authorized control actuators in vehicles.
In order to facilitate the evaluation of light-weight detection methods, we choose two accessible ways, i.e., injecting messages and suspending messages, to construct typical attack scenarios for in-vehicle networks. As an external attack method, injecting messages can cause major attacks in automotive networks, such as spoof, replay, and flooding. Suspending messages, which is basically an internal attack method, can cause absence of messages or delay of message transmission. This special way can bring about drop attacks for in-vehicle networks. Thus this study aims to investigate four typical attacks, i.e., spoof, replay, flooding, and drop. For better understanding of the difference between these attacks, this present study constructs four attack scenarios to evaluate the performance of different intrusion detection methods. Initially, an automotive bus simulation test software, vehicle spy, and relative hardware were applied to construct the four attack scenarios and obtain precise sampling data. As shown in Fig. 2 , we collected twenty hours data from Buick Hideo which was starting state and presented characteristics of the data in Table 1 . To simulate attack behaviors, we replayed the collected real-car data in vehicle spy and performed different operations to realize four attacks as shown in Fig. 3 . Specifically, we undertook three injecting attacks, i.e., spoof, replay, and flooding, through sending varied frequencies and IDs of messages, and realized drop attack by stopping sending messages. The messages of in-vehicle networks mainly include a series of items as shown in Fig.3 . In our experiment, only two items of the message were underscored, i.e., reception time and ID of messages, to implement light-weight abnormal detection of in-vehicle networks. As the number of received messages is diverse under four attack scenarios, we captured one million messages arbitrarily to guarantee the equal amount of detected data. Besides, we performed one type of attack intermittently in one set of data.
In view of detection contents and the evaluated detection algorithms, we extracted four parameters to depict different scenarios. Table 2 lists these parameters, and their meanings are described as follows: N attack : the total number of attack packets including injection packets and stop-sending packets.
T attack : transmission period of attack packets. To observe the detection results clearly, we implemented the four attack scenarios though periodic packets. As drop scenario has no attack packets, this value is absent in Table 2 .
% attack : the proportion of N attack to N packets . This parameter is important for the reason that it will reflect the occupancy rate of attack behaviors in test data.
B. EVALUATION METRICS
Intrusion detection technology is primarily composed of anomaly detection and misuse detection. Anomaly detection is defined to compare current activity with the established normal activity database to recognize intrusion behavior when the difference between them violates certain statistical law. Misuse detection, also known as feature detection, compares the current activity with the established intrusion activity database. When the current activity is in line with these established patterns, then intrusion activity happens. Due to the difficulty in obtaining features of intrusion activity, IDS mainly focuses on anomaly detection. In this paper, we merely discuss anomaly detection methods and relative performances.
Anomaly detection methods are designed to identify whether the current behavior is different from normal behavior, evaluation metrics of detection performance is thus vital to the method. Previous literatures mostly presented the sheer results of false alarm ratio and true detection ratio under the proposed methods. However, previous studies are lack of real car data and large proportions of abnormal behavior in test dataset. In this section, adequate evaluation metrics based on test datasets and experimental scenarios will be presented. Owing to the evaluation target, we focus on two characteristics of detection results, i.e., ROC curve and P-R curve. In addition, there are some other evaluation metrics such as Area Under Curve (AUC) and F-score, which depend on statistics of normal and anomalous examples in detection methods. There are some metrics of performance in given threshold, and they are defined as follows.
• True positive (TP): abnormal data correctly labeled anomalous;
• True negative (TN): normal data correctly labeled normal;
• False positive (FP): normal data incorrectly labeled anomalous;
• False negative (FN): abnormal data incorrectly labeled normal.
According to statistics listed in Table 2 , two characteristic curves will be introduced as follows.
1) ROC CURVE
ROC curve is a coordinate map composed of false positive rate (FPR), a horizontal axis, and true positive rate (TPR), a vertical axis. FPR and TPR can be drawn from change of threshold range in the test dataset. And FPR and TPR are defined as:
On the basis of relevant definitions, ROC curve is a comprehensive metric that reflects the sensitivity and specificity of a continuous variable. The area under ROC curve, known as AUC, is regarded as an important evaluation metric. FPR and TPR are also two important evaluation metrics and can be applied to evaluate the performance of detection methods in most cases. Besides, AUC is usually used as an additional condition to evaluate the performance of one detection method.
2) P-R CURVE
Precision and recall are two important metrics in detection performance evaluation, and the curve composed of the two metrics is called P-R curve. Precision (P) and recall (R) are defined as follows.
Reflecting classification and retrieval capabilities, precision and recall are a pair of conflicting measures. Generally speaking, the recall is low when the precision is high, and the accuracy rate is low when the recall rate is high, vice versa. However, the performance of detection methods cannot be determined by mere one metric. It should be notice that both recall and FPR share the same definition from (2) and (4), and this paper uses FPR to represent recall in the following sections. Besides, the area under P-R curve can reflect the performance of detection methods, it can also obscure some important information.
As a solution, precision and recall were integrated into a weighted harmonic mean called F-score, which is:
In (5), β reflects the importance of recall compared to precision. When β = 1, (5) is reduced into a standard VOLUME 6, 2018
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F1-score. Using (3), (4) , and (5), we have
By analyzing (3), (4), and (6), we know that F 1 can reflect the balance of P and R. An excellent detection performance is low in the value of FP and FN, a good detection method is thus low in F 1 . Therefore, we choose F 1 as one evaluation metric to judge the performance of detection methods in this paper.
In summary, TPR, FPR, and F 1 are selected as the evaluation metrics finally, combined with two characteristic curves, ROC-curve and P-R curve.
V. INTRUSION DETECTION AND EVALUATION A. INTRUSION DETECTION METHOD
Various intrusion detection methods for in-vehicle networks are presented in Section II. In this paper, we underline the light-weight intrusion detection methods for the sake of application. In view of existing study, the major contents applied in light-weight intrusion detection methods are summarized in four aspects: diversity, timestamp, sequence, and traffic. Therefore, we choose four light-weight intrusion detection methods to investigate their performance in particular attack scenarios. The four comparative detection methods are: information entropy [14] , CIDS [13] , ID sequence [16] , and Throughput [15] .
B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
As an active protective measure, IDS is sensitive to false positives and needs high detection accuracy. False positives would disrupt the normal operation of systems, whereas detection accuracy could weaken the effectiveness of IDS. Therefore, it is critical to consider the two targets synthetically. In this paper, ROC curve is selected as the evaluating indictor based on the test data described in Section IV. ROC curve depicts the relation between TPR and FPR with varying detection thresholds, and makes it possible to compare different detection methods with independent decision thresholds. In ROC graph, the top left point has ideal detection performance: 0% FPR and 100% TPR. What's more, the area under curve of ROC curve can also reflect the detection accuracy.
According to experimental results, we designed different detection thresholds for every method to evaluate different metrics in four attack scenarios. To obtain intact ROC curves, Table 3 lists different threshold range in four detection methods. In Table 3 , the threshold range is determined by the judgement values of different detection algorithms and the statistical values of different evaluation metrics.
On account of performance evaluation, we adopted the same attack data to test the four intrusion detection methods. It should be noticed that ID sequence method needs to train the non-attack data by learning normal behaviors. In this paper, the normal data with one million messages are selected to train to get the sequences between different IDs in normal data collected in real cars. According to the analysis of detection results of different methods, we plotted ROC curves and P-R curves for comparison in one scenario. Fig. 4 stands for ROC curves and Fig. 5 P-R curves in four attack scenarios. Description and evaluation of different detection methods in four attack scenarios are presented below.
1) SPOOF
A message with ID 101 was forged and a piece of normal data injected, with transmission cycle of ten millisecond as shown in Table 2 . In Fig. 4(1) , ID sequence method has 100% of TPR, with normal training data of only four hundred second captured from the real car, whereas CIDS method has 100% of TPR in most thresholds. The reason is that spoof attacks increased new ID sequences and remarkably affected the reception timestamp of injected messages. Throughput method performs better than information entropy, but not as well as ID sequence and CIDS. In this scenario, the proportion of injected messages to total messages per second is about 4.2%, difficult to identify abnormal data. Similarly, the value of information entropy is not large enough compared with the data without attacks. Compared with Fig. 4 (1), Fig. 5 (1) reveals that the four methods have similar rules between P-R curves and ROC curves.
2) REPLAY
A message with ID 191 was replayed with ten millisecond at every attack. In Fig. 4 (2) , CIDS method has 100% of TPR in most thresholds, whereas ID sequence has 97.45% of TPR and 0.004% of FPR after training. In this scenario, Throughput method has similar ROC curve with that in spoof scenario, yet the performance of information entropy is worse than that of spoof attack. There is no difference between replay and spoof except the type of injected messages, thus ROC curves are the same for methods of CIDS, ID sequence, and Throughput. However, notable differences exist in the diversity of replay and spoof attacks because there were no new types of messages for the former one. In Fig. 5 (2) , the results underscore that information entropy is worst in classification for the reason that it depends on diversity of detection messages heavily.
3) FLOODING
A message with ID 1A1 exiting in real cars was selected and replayed in high frequency (one thousand messages per second) to realize flooding attack. In view of Fig. 4 (3) , it can be seen that the methods of CIDS and Throughput, which have close ROC curves for the difference between them can be seen only in a minimal range, are better in performance than the other two, and Information entropy is still the worst detection method. In flooding scenario, the proportion of injected messages to total messages per second is 30.3%, remarkably changing reception timestamp and throughput of injected messages. The newly generated ID sequences included original ones, therefore there were some false positives. Besides, information entropy values changed a lot in that injected message proportion enhanced significantly. In Fig. 5 (3) , Throughput method represents the optimal detection performance, especially better than CIDS method. Thus, it can be concluded that Throughput method is the most suitable to detect flooding attacks in four methods.
4) DROP
In order to drop message transmittance in CAN bus, a forged message, which was regarded as a normal one, was halted. The training data in ID sequence method should thus be changed accordingly. According to Fig. 4 (4) and Fig. 5 (4) , CIDS is the best approach to detect drop attacks. Information entropy and Throughput are similar in detection performance. In this scenario, ID sequence method has 11.9% of TPR and 0% of FPR (no new sequences were generated). Drop attacks could affect diversity, reception timestamp and throughput of messages, the four methods thus all have good detection performances.
Curves for different attack scenarios are presented in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 , and they can be adopted to distinguish the four detection methods. By comparing each detection method under the four scenarios, this paper summarizes the detection performance of the four methods as follows.
(1) CIDS scored remarkable achievements in detection performance under the four attack scenarios. Taking timestamp of received messages as the basic feature and clock drift of ECUs as the detection feature, CIDS was quite sensitive to changes on timestamp of messages. Besides, CIDS recorded high value of TPR and low value of FPR, and all these make it a preferred solution for light-weight intrusion detection.
(2) Throughput method performed better in detecting flooding attack than the other three attacks. As change of traffic is not obvious in some attacks that cause little effect for the number of packets. Therefore, Throughput method can be applied to attacks like flooding or DoS.
(3) ID sequence method has high TPR (over 97%) and nearly 0% of FPR, with training data of only four hundred second in spoof and replay. Being the only method without threshold for abnormal data detection, ID sequence performed favorably in scenarios like inserting forged messages. However, it is notable that this method should have training data to store normal orders of messages.
(4) Information entropy performed worse in replay attacks than the others. As a typical detection method in other fields, information entropy showed its comprehensiveness in detecting different attacks. However, its detection performance weakened under scenarios bearing little change in diversity of messages (such as replay attack).
In addition, it has been proved that spoof constitutes the easiest attack to be detected, and these four methods mainly depends on the detection performance for a certain attack scenario. ID sequence could also detect aperiodic injecting attacks, which is difficult for the other three methods to detect. Therefore, a detection method should be evaluated in both detection performance and its features.
To describe the detection performance more specifically, we set appropriate thresholds to reflect certain methods' detection ability as much as possible. In Table 2 , the proportion of attacks in the total data is small, disrupting statistics of FP. FPR in the test will thus be quite sensitive to the threshold. Among all points on ROC curves, the closest point from the upper left corner has the best detection performance with the optimal threshold. Therefore, we select the optimal threshold according to the ROC curve and obtain comprehensive evaluation metrics to evaluate the performance of detection methods. According to the analysis result in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 , we obtain the optimum thresholds and calculate the given evaluation metrics in different attack scenarios as shown in Tables 4-7 .
As displayed in Tables 4-7 , TPR and FPR can basically reflect the detection performance of certain methods for the other metrics have a consistent trend of change. When two methods share similar values of TPR and FPR, the evaluation Table 6 , yet the value of F1-score of Throughput is higher than that of CIDS, manifesting that Throughput method performed better than CIDS method. Besides, it can be observed that a method with higher F1-score is always followed by higher TRP and lower FPR, revealing that F-measure is also an important evaluation metric except for TPR and FPR.
According to the comparison of differing performance parameters in different scenarios, we can evaluate the detection ability of the four detection methods. ROC and P-R curves make it possible for us to intuitively compare the performance of two or more methods, and even obtain the optimal threshold for a method's best detection performance. We can also identify which method has robustness in detection by comparing evaluation metrics in different scenarios.
However, the referred four methods are not appropriate to the anomaly detection for aperiodic messages. As the irregular frequency of aperiodic messages, there should be quantities of data including sufficient aperiodic messages to construct effective database, which is not suitable for lightweight detection methods.
In conclusion, this research is designed to find out the best detection method for certain attack by comparative evaluation of the performance of varying methods, putting every method to suitable use with low cost.
VI. CONCLUSION
5G technology to some extent aggravates security risks in vehicular networks. As key nodes in data transmission, invehicle networks carry massive information for normal communication and function operation. Through analysis of the security threats that may occur in 5G vehicular network, several typical attack scenarios for in-vehicle networks are proposed accordingly. To investigate an optimal solution to potential security risks, this paper focuses on intrusion detection methods for in-vehicle networks and discusses four attack scenarios: spoof, replay, flooding, and drop. With CAN messages collected from a real car, four types of attacks are designed in a simulation testing software to build different attack databases. According to the requirement analysis of presented scenarios, we outline four light-weight detection methods: information entropy, CIDS, ID sequence, and Throughput. These methods are evaluated and compared by plotting ROC curves and P-R curves under the same conditions. There are fairly difference between the detection performances for the four detection methods with the evaluation comparison. The evaluation results breed optimal solution to detection of abnormal behaviors that may occur during communications, providing significant guidance for on-line intrusion detection in vehicle terminals.
There is room for improvement in this work. This paper only analyzes light-weight intrusion detection methods, yet ignoring complex detection algorithms such as machine learning and data words carrying major information of packets of vehicles. To develop a general method, this paper neglects aperiodic messages due to their irregularity. Besides, evaluation of performance was performed through offline data, whereas intrusion detection methods should have been tested on line. The above defects will act as starting points in our further research on improvement of security protection mechanism for in-vehicle networks. We hope our research will be effective and reliable for control of threats and reduction of losses. 
